Allan Young (McGill University, Montreal, Canada)

Out of the Shadows: Schadenfreude and Human Nature

The German term *Schadenfreude*, taking pleasure in learning of someone’s suffering, entered English usage during the 1850s. For a century, it remained an obscure and rarely discussed emotion, interchangeable with ‘gloating’. Behavioural economists discovered *Schadenfreude* in the 1950s, and employed it in experiments intended to measure the strength of the emotional bonds linking people to affinity groups. (For instance, the groups included “brand communities”: BMW owners were asked to read scenarios depicting mechanical misfortunes of Mercedes drivers; their self-reported *Schadenfreude* indexed their brand loyalty.) *Schadenfreude* experiments were similarly employed by social psychologists to study ethnic self-identity, political party orientation, and loyalty to sports clubs. Their concern with *Schadenfreude* was instrumental rather than psychological or philosophical, and they had no interest in its moral grammar of syntax. So far, only one English-speaking philosopher has approached *Schadenfreude* as a discrete object of inquiry, and unique representative of the moral emotions. Our cultural understanding of *Schadenfreude* is changing, but as a consequence of the “neuroscience revolution” and, more specifically, the unprecedented possibilities provided by functional neuroimaging, and not the philosophy of emotion. In 2011, *Schadenfreude* continues to perform an instrumental role in experiments. Its job is to make the brain perform on command and, through these performances, illuminate the brain’s social origins and moral capacities. Thus *Schadenfreude* now steps out of the shadows and into human nature.
Emotions by electric shock: how Duchenne de Boulogne solves the problem of "true" expression

First published in 1862, Duchenne's photographs of facial expressions strike the beholder with an instant and dual effect: while disturbing, they also make a radical claim to represent an authenticity of emotional expression. He is convinced that "Armed with electrodes, one would be able, like nature herself, to paint the expressive lines of the emotions of the soul on the face of man." Duchenne's work, groundbreaking in its time, stands at the crossroads of photography, electricity and medicine. In this way it gives an insight into different aspects of the notion of facial expression in its historical moment and in the environment Walter Benjamin called "capital of the 19th century": modern Paris.

Drawing on the deliberations of Walter Benjamin, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Susan Sontag, this paper aims to bring together a concept of "shock"—for Benjamin a limit concept between the individual and the socio-technological—with a reflection on the relationship of "shock" to the "image", in a time when physiognomists were beginning to identify types of people in an anonymous mass society.

I will show that the question of the authenticity or artificiality of emotions is much less important than that of the relationship of the individual to his/her expression. Duchenne de Boulogne induces "true" "emotions of the soul" by sacrificing its lively foundation. He literally creates a death mask. In so doing, he does not only shed light on the deadly nature of positivism, but furthermore, the way in which the perception of images might result in a fetishized idea of reality in general. Therefore, to speak with Adorno, we might say that the golden era of emotions begins just as it begins to disappear. The challenge resulting from these questions and from Duchenne's work is how emotions might be remembered in a manner that transcends the "death mask" of today's reality.

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Sarah Chaney (Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL)

“An emotional but ill-rulled machine”: Impulse, Self-Control and Civilization in Late Nineteenth Century Britain
When late nineteenth century asylum psychiatrists reflected on self-mutilation within the asylum, they frequently turned to the arguments of anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists. Developed within a Darwinistic framework, these theories show a similar expansion to that described by George Stocking within anthropology, where an easy metaphorical extension was made from the biological evolution of species, through explanations of the social evolution of civilization described by ethnologists, to the intellectual and emotional development of the individual, in works such as those of Herbert Spencer. For psychiatrists, the latter was of most immediate relevance – thus, this paper will argue, their conclusions tended to reverse the process described by Stocking, so that an act of self-mutilation was seen to exhibit a failure of self-control in the individual, which, in turn, might lead to a decline of civilization and, ultimately, the potential biological degeneration of the race.

Within these frameworks, a civilized individual was required to exhibit a balance between volition and emotion. That such “rational self-control” was not, however, solely intended as a process of emotional repression is made prominent in this study of self-mutilation. When patients suggested that a self-injurious act was essentially therapeutic, relieving the “pressure” of extreme emotion, it was hard for psychiatrists to argue that any such act was pathological, for they too suggested that the repression of emotions might be physically dangerous. Moreover, the perceived proximity of “minor mutilations” to “nervous habits”, including fidgeting and nail-biting, suggested that physical behaviour might sometimes form an aspect of emotional self-control. Conversely, certain acts, in particular self-castration, were construed as removing individual responsibility: in effect, preventing the ability to rationally control impulse. In conclusion, I will thus suggest that the relation of self-mutilation with emotional and impulsive behaviour was closely connected with social and political concerns: individual freedom, and the responsibilities of the individual toward society.

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Corina Dobos (Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL)

“Emotional instability” as main factor for „criminal behaviour“ in interwar Romania: Concepts, tests and their results

My study deals with the research carried out on penitentiary detainees and under-age delinquents at the Ferdinand I University of Cluj (Romania) during the interwar period in the areas of juridical psychology, abnormal psychology and legal medicine. I argue that the Cluj experts conferred new meanings to the semantic couple “emotional instability”- “inhibition” (see Roger Smith), of practical use in legal medicine and criminology. I will particularly
focus on the semantic operations made by the Cluj specialists in order to “define and identify the psychical constitution with criminal dispositions”, as documented in the scientific literature of that time. Thus, I discuss the correlations the experts established between the results of the specific tests they run in order to assess the “emotional instability” of delinquents and different types of criminal behaviour.

At the turn of the 20th century, under the growing influence of biology and medicine an “epistemological shift” took place in Europe in the domain of criminal sciences. An international group of penal reformers was challenging the classical jurisprudence doctrine of punishment and strove to change the existing penal system, by diverting its focus “on the criminal, and not on the crime”. Gradually, several changes and transfers occurred within the category of “internal factors” that were thought to cause a criminal behaviour: the anatomically localized abnormalities of the “inborn criminals” turned into “functional” (neural), endocrinological or psychological abnormalities. Thus, in interwar Europe, along with mental deficiency, the “emotional and affective anomalies” were thought to lead in the long run to a criminal, a-social behaviour.

“Emotional instability” was believed to be in an inverse ratio with the capacity of self control. For the experts at Cluj University, one’s capacity to refrain from legally punishable acts was directly affected by this “anomaly.” This type of anomalies could be assessed and measured through specific tests, and important inferences were to be drawn between specific “emotional anomalies” and different types of crimes. Thieves, for example, were thought to have an over-developed “acquisition instinct”, whereas their “impulses of curiosity and sociability” were found to be under-developed.

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**Sabine Donauer** (Max Planck Institute, Berlin)

**Emotions at Work – Working on Emotions, Germany, 1900 - 1970**

How does a human being feel at work? Do feelings like boredom and fatigue impinge on work performance? How do human relations affect work output and how can they themselves be worked upon?

With the advent of industrialization, these and related questions were given increasing attention. On the one hand, the momentum of the labor movement brought about the question how the emotion of ‘class hatred’ could be replaced by a feeling of belonging to the ‘factory family’. On the other hand, the rising interest in the emotions of the workers can be attributed to efforts to increase work performance: The rationalization movement of the 1920s was the
founding moment of the idea that the ‘happy’ worker is all the more ‘productive’. The constitution of this link gave rise to the development of entirely new scientific disciplines. Occupational science, labor sociology as well as work psychology started to create knowledge about how the inner life of the worker could be reconciled and interwoven with the requirements of industrial production.

The proposed paper will focus on the impact psychological knowledge had on emotion regulation practices at industrial work settings in 20th century Germany. The following key questions shall be pursued: How were emotions conceived in the above mentioned disciplines? How did this scientific knowledge translate into corporate emotional norms and practices? How did processes of psychologization and work performance enhancement change the evaluation and expression of emotions at work? These questions will be illustrated and partly answered by using publications from the occupational sciences, source material from corporate archives as well as advisory literature and training manuals for interpersonal skills development in companies.

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Mark Honigsbaum (QMUL)

‘A sense of dread is very general’: the Spanish flu, the Northcliffe press, and emotion on the home front in World War One

‘Never since the Black Death has such a plague swept over the face of the world...[and] never, perhaps, has a plague been more stoically accepted.’ So claimed The Times at the height of the destructive second wave of the ‘Spanish’ influenza in December 1918. But how was this mastery of emotion achieved and what other emotions did this stoicism mask? This paper argues that the supposed stoicism evinced by The Times in 1918 was first and foremost a reflection of wartime propaganda and the politicisation of ‘dread’ as an emotion with the potential to undermine national morale. To the extent that fear and hatred of Germany could galvanise the civilian population against a common enemy, dread was a crucial propaganda tool in the hands of the government and the Northcliffe press; but to the extent that excessive dread could undermine civilian morale it was potentially pathological, an emotion that had to be carefully regulated. This was especially the case during the final year of the conflict when war-weariness set in and the British public became increasingly sceptical of Lloyd George’s war aims, resulting in a tightening of propaganda and the stricter policing of negative emotions. Initially, the Spanish flu, drew on these political discourses. At the same time, however, these discourses were at odds with and clashed with medical discourses that sought
to employ dread of disease as an instrument of biopower. The result was that as dread increasingly became attached to influenza, it destabilized both the propaganda discourses and medical attempts to regulate the civilian response to the pandemic, undermining the stoicism evinced by The Times.

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Adrian Howe (School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning, RMIT University)

Hell still hath no fury: Law’s concession to passion’s homicidal excesses

A human (read: male) right to passion has been enshrined in the English law of provocation since the 18th century. In the leading 1701 case of Mawbridge, Lord Holt famously singled out terminating an adulterous act as one of four categories that fell within the defence. He did so in decidedly (though frequently overlooked) sexed terms:

Where a man is taken in adultery with another man’s wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property.

Traditionally described as a concession to a generic ‘human frailty’, provocation defences have always been associated with anger, but it is overwhelmingly men who have resorted to the defence, most controversially in femicide cases where they express their rage at being ‘provoked’ to homicidal fury by an allegedly adulterous woman partner. This paper examines recent law reforms introduced in England and Wales largely as a response to campaigners’ calls to halt the culture of excuses that continues to pander to jealous and possessive men who hurt or kill women. It focuses on provisions in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 which replaces the provocation defence with a new defence of ‘loss of control’ and explicitly excludes sexual infidelity as a ‘trigger’ for loss of control. It is argued that the reforms, introduced to control emotional excess by tightening up provocation-type defences so that they are no longer available to jealous men, will not work to achieve this goal. Notwithstanding law reformers’ lengthy and painstaking efforts to produce a more just law of homicide by restricting the availability of partial defences to murder, provocation scripts will continue to provide over-emotional men who kill ‘their’ women with affective (and effective) excuses for murder. The underlying and seemingly intractable problem is law’s persistent disavowals of its sexed asymmetries and, related, its incapacity to un-think and thus master men’s right to ‘passion’.

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Ofra Koffman (King’s College)

Normal abnormality? Emotional turmoil in adolescence from G. Stanley Hall to Contemporary Neuroscience

From its introduction into modern psychology, ‘adolescence’ has been associated with emotional turmoil. Claims that adolescents are impulsive, that they undergo a period of ‘storm and stress’, ‘regression’ or ‘acting out’ have been recurrently evoked. This paper will outline a brief account of some of the key propositions regarding adolescent emotions put forward by psychologists and psychiatrists during the 20th and early 21st century. It will specifically highlight the new ways in which contemporary neuroscientific research reiterates some of the earlier propositions regarding adolescents’ emotions. In addition, the paper will reflect upon the way in which emotional abnormality has been understood as being part of a normal developmental path.

Mary Luckhurst (University of York, UK)

Acting and the Discipline of Empathy

The idea that an actor must have empathy for the character she is playing has become a truism in dominant western acting traditions. In fact, this received wisdom has permeated through various interpretations of twentieth century understandings of Stanislavsky’s teachings and powerfully influences the ideologies of the most celebrated actor training establishments.

A crude formulation of Stanislavskian theory purveys an idea that if an actor completely understands a character, she becomes them. In this model, an actor’s empathy for a character is often constructed as a method for discovering ways of sympathizing with one’s subject or ways of finding the subject agreeable. An actor might do this, for example, by being taught how to find similarities between her self and the other or by being taught that certain methods of constructing imaginative back histories and psychological mapping can lead to complete identification. Such theory seems to suggest a volatile and paradoxical idea of complete control and total submission: that the actor colonises the other through knowledge but at the moment of ultimate knowledge makes a sudden turn and surrenders to the other.

Recent testimony in books such as Playing for Real (Cantrell & Luckhurst: Palgrave, 2010) and The Politics of American Actor Training (Margolis & Renaud: Routledge, 2010) do not support these pervasive assumptions. Established and early career actors are now beginning to breaking the myth of empathy by going on record and arguing that knowability is not possible and often not desirable. Using Martha Nussbaum’s theories of empathy and
compassion I will investigate the received construction of the discipline of empathy among in
the acting world.

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**Joseph Maslen** (Sheffield Hallam)

**Anthony Blunt: Emotional Control in the Theatre of Thatcherism**

Anthony Blunt (1907-83), the Keeper of the Queen’s Pictures and Communist spy whose
memoirs have recently come into the public domain, epitomises the idea of emotional
mastery. In general terms, historians of the Cambridge Spies have presented Blunt’s self-
possession as an unsettling compression of the natural emotions. More specifically, the drama
of the press conference that Blunt conducted with the *Times* in the aftermath of his exposure
in 1979 has seemed to demonstrate the extent of his iron will not to let any emotion let slip,
and to control the theatre of the event.

At the time, the wider community of commentators on Blunt’s “treason” pathologised his
appearance at the press conference in peculiar, medicalised ways. In particular, when such
commentators questioned his lack of humanity they described it less as robotic than as
reptilian. His blood seemed to flow at a cold temperature; his eyes to stare at his persecutors
with the vacancy of the predatory lizard. In the context of the politics of the New Right and
its criticism of the opacity of the State—and more particularly those of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, the Methodist alderman grocer’s daughter from Lincolnshire—this
hardened control of the emotions seemed to relate to a gentlemanly code of conduct that laid
aside natural feelings in favour of propriety, and which consequently had secured Blunt
immunity from prosecution since 1964. The public man’s dignity, his emotional mastery,
now stood defiant before a regime which sought to break its emotional resistance.

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**Rachel Aisengart Menezes** (University of Brazil)

**Demands for euthanasia and personhood: reflections on the “statute of tears”**

This paper focuses on the condition of contemporary personhood, by examining recent media
articles about demands for legal authorization of euthanasia. One example is the case of
Christian Rossiter, who became tetraplegic after being run over by a car. In his request –
authorized by the West Australian Supreme Court in August 2009 – he stated that “he is
unable to perform even the most basic human functions, such as wipe the tears from his face”.
This request differs from others, in which the argument concentrates on pain and physical
suffering, as occurred, for instance, with Chantal Sébire, in France, or in states of vegetative
life, as with Eluana Englaro, in Italy. We use Rossiter’s case in order to show how
contemporary conceptions of personhood cannot be separated from the sphere of emotions – and their control. This paper discusses the changes in what we call "the statue of tears" in modern Western society, that is, the changes of the meanings of the tears and public expression of crying, especially in regard to radical situations of life/death, when it is necessary to define the limits of the person’s existence.

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Chris Millard (QMUL)

Mastery through “Translation Fetish” - Emotional States, Attempted Suicide and Punch Card Technology

Beginning in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s psychiatrists in Britain made increasing use of what they called “computing machines”. Feeding the results of their psychological questionnaires into these machines by way of edge-clipped computer punch cards, they were able to apply statistical and mathematical functions to psychological data that were more complex than ever before. Through the now-unfamiliar practices of renting computing time, specialist programmers and computer programs from universities, they were able to employ statistical sense-making tools in ever more sophisticated ways. This had significant consequences for the ways in which psychological and emotional states were conceptualised.

Data gained from personality tests were often processed in these ways, and this paper will examine ways in which a group of Edinburgh clinicians made sense out of an “epidemic of attempted suicide”, conceived by them not as aimed at death in any simple way, but instead as a “cry for help”. They attempted this by performing a string of translation practices: from questionnaire and “personality inventory” answers, to computer punch cards, through various computer program machinations, to supposed emotional states, all in a quest for the “attempted suicide personality”. Beginning in the early 1960s with rather folkish, catch-all notions of “emotional distress”, the clinicians became more technical as the decade wore on, with concepts of “introversion” and “extraversion” laid over ideas of hostility which made possible the idea that “extrapunitiveness” (punishing the self) and “intropunitiveness” (punishing others) were both central to this “attempted suicide as cry for help”.

Thus the idea of “mastery” investigated here is one of technological and professional control, configuring emotional states through translation practices in order to make sense out of, and to better predict and treat – i.e. to master – “attempted suicide”.

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**Tom Quick** (Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL)

**Losing humanity: physiological psychology, emotional expression and critique of the nervous subject during the nineteenth century**

This paper characterises the emergence of alternative forms of emotional expression as concomitant with the articulation of different modes of subjectivity. Drawing on the publications of four nineteenth-century British figures - Thomas Laycock (1812-1876), William Benjamin Carpenter (1813-1885), Edward Carpenter (1844-1929), and Samuel Butler (1835-1902) - it interrogates what I believe to constitute a critical shift in Western culture.

I contend that the notions of emotional expression articulated in the physiological psychologies of the first two of these figures exemplifies a tension characteristic of a culture which had not previously emphasised embodied notions of being. On the one hand, we see in Laycock's texts an emphasis on embodied, non-rational experience and expression as fundamental to the conduct of life. On the other, W.B. Carpenter's texts relate a 'disembodied' ideal of rational or wilful control over threateningly 'bodily' affect.

In contrast, Edward Carpenter and Butler's texts are marked by an agreement over the fundamental, embodied role of emotion or 'desire' in experience. The nevertheless marked differences between these latter figures, I believe, can be understood in terms of what I term a 'post-physiological' dynamic. In this dynamic, the expression of affect is related, on the one hand, to notions of humanity one participant amongst many in a unitary, ideally harmonious 'living-consciousness.' On the other hand, humanity becomes a species whose desire for emotional integrity and self-consistency is constantly being undermined by an ever-more-determining 'technology.' By the late nineteenth century, the increasingly pervasive notion of self as brain or nervous system is beginning to attract a critical literature in which emotion is understood as humanity's principal means of collaborating with - and thereby losing itself in - non-human aspects of its environment.

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**Matt Savelli** (Oxford University)

**Sadness under “Happy Socialism”**: Depression and Psychiatry in Titoist Yugoslavia

The material, social, and intellectual climate of Yugoslavia during the Communist (1945-1991) period was routinely praised by all but Tito’s fiercest critics. Western observers were largely pleased to see a country beyond the Iron Curtain turn its back on Stalinism. Citizens elsewhere under the Communist umbrella looked on enviously at the living standards and liberal climate enjoyed by Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia’s Communist Party, meanwhile, could be happy with their stranglehold on power and Tito himself could celebrate the fact that he was a
legitimately popular leader. Amidst this gleeful climate, however, some Yugoslav citizens were never in the mood to celebrate. This paper traces the efforts of psychiatrists to confront and resolve the problems of sadness and depression in this “socialist paradise.”

This first section entails the conceptualization of depression and extreme sadness from a clinical perspective. It considers the way that psychiatrists melded the disparate cultural legacies of Yugoslavia (Hapsburg and Ottoman) into a single framework of depression. It then briefly highlights the epidemiological statistics that indicated constantly increasing rates of depression, despite the constantly improving conditions trumpeted by the regime’s propagandists. After considering psychiatric debates on the framing of the illness, it examines in detail the attempts by Yugoslav practitioners to work out exactly what was causing all of this depression. While some theorists focused on the individual’s relationship to the family, others saw modern civilization as the genesis of extreme sadness. For a small group of researchers, meanwhile, the question of culture remained at the root of depression.

The final part of the paper dedicates itself to an investigation of the treatments employed by psychiatrists in their attempts to alleviate people’s unhappiness, including psychotherapy, somatic treatments, and pharmaceutical interventions. Ultimately, the paper underlines the influence of the social psychiatry movement in dealing with the anomaly of so much sadness in such happy times.

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**Richard C. Sha** (American University)

**The Chemistry and Physics of Romantic Emotion**

Beginning with current treatments of affect that treat it as a force that resists subjectivity (Ahmed, Clough), this paper considers what it means to think of the emotions in terms of force, and the role that early nineteenth century science played in making the emotions manageable. Because force now is divested of any animistic associations, and because it has become purely relational (Jammer 7), affect as force acquires the power to disrupt subjectivity and notions of the human.

In Romantic period chemistry, by contrast, although Lavoisier tried to mathematicize the field, the concept of affinity—the attractive force of one entity for another—remained qualitative, and therefore resistant to control. In physics, the concept of force was borrowed from an analogy to human willpower or muscular effort (Jammer 7) and became projected into physical objects as the power of inanimate things. Adela Pinch has shown how Hume understands the emotions in terms of Newtonian concepts of force yet he modifies Newton to think of force as the quality of the mind’s attention to its own ideas (36). This paper therefore examines what was gained from chemistry’s and physics’s notions of force, and considers
how the emotions as force in the nineteenth century opened up issues of mastery. Writing on mental derangement, Alexander Crichton, suggested that emotions follow passions not in terms of the principles of psychological association but rather it “resembles the motion of a body when impelled by another” (345). As a mechanical force, emotions seem beyond the subject’s control. However, the mathematicization of emotional forces—think here of Bentham’s felicific calculus—made the emotions seem manipulable, controllable, and subject to logic. At the same time, insofar as forces endow matter with a kind of subjectivity—the chemical language of affinity made elements act like human beings—this subjectivity within mechanicity throws a wrench into the logic of emotion. When Wordsworth links Lucy with a “motion and force that rolls through all things,” then, he collapses personhood and objects, emotions and identity, and spirit and matter, in a hybrid form that ultimately leaves open the question of who or what is in charge.

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Ingrid Sykes (IMR, School of Advanced Study, University of London)

Emotional Expansion: Ecological Listening in Early Nineteenth-Century France

Scholars agree that at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a critical shift in the history of musical emotion. During the eighteenth century, it was believed that music had so thoroughly possessed the body and its nervous system that the rational soul had become compromised. The solution was to refashion the relationship between nature and culture so as to cultivate a new form of emotional behaviour amongst the populace, termed ‘spiritual listening’, one which is still common in the modern-world today. As Pierre Bourdieu explains: “For a bourgeois world which conceives its relation to the populace in terms of its relationship of the soul to the body, ‘insensitivity to music’ doubtless represents a particularly unavowable form of materialist coarseness”.

In this paper I argue that it was not only in instrumental music of the nineteenth century that we begin to understand the emotional sensibility of the spiritual listener but also in the construction and design of musical instruments. French patent designs from 1800-1830 demonstrated such a delicate balancing of organic and mechanic features that they demanded an almost transpersonal ecological emotional response from the listener. That is to say, instruments were designed to evoke a kind of listening which sought to expand the sense of self beyond the ‘egoic, biographical or personal’ in order to establish a particular relationship with the non-human world. Such listening did, ultimately, involve moral definition. During the listening process however, moral authority was entirely forgotten. Instead, the ear was used to cultivate a greater environmental awareness within the listener.

In France, such musical instruments were positioned within public institutions for the improvement of the ‘citizen-self’: hospitals, schools, musical, fine arts and crafts institutions,
institutions for the disabled and special institutions for children. Manufactured sound was used to create an expansive emotional sense of auditory territoriality within specific sites of cultural production. Spiritual listening and institutional regulation were carefully combined so as to master the emotions of the inhabitants and awaken the conscious self.

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Juan M. Zaragoza (Instituto de Filosofía, Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, Madrid)

The Colour of your Soul: Mastering the Other’s Emotions: Illness, Exile, and Material Culture

Depression is characterized by the inability of the patient to control his or her own emotions. The well known depression’s symptoms are sadness, loss of interest or pleasure in activities the patient uses to enjoy, feelings of worthlessness, thoughts of death or suicide, among others. The treatment is designed for the control of the symptoms, and the use of antidepressant and talk therapy (sometimes at the same time) are recommended. The goal of therapy is, basically, to master the other’s emotions, since he or she is unable to do it by him or herself.

In my paper, I will explore a third possibility: the use of material culture to cope with other’s uncontrolled emotions. I will use the creation of the Zenobia Camprubí – Juan Ramón Jimenez Room (ZC-JRJ) at the University of Puerto Rico in the 1950’s as a case study. I will show how the creation of the Room, (the accumulation of objects with personal meanings to JRJ and ZC) was ZC’s attempt to master JR’s emotions. A therapeutic purpose was conferred to the collection of these objects. The accumulation of stuff was supposed to wane JR’s negative emotions, and to encourage JR’s positive ones.

The Room fulfilled a second function, related, this time, with ZC’s disease: a terminal cancer. Her task (the collection of objects for the Room) became a sort of emotional refuge for ZC. An escape route from the pressure of dealing with both diseases: its own and JR’s. The task of collecting and arranging the objects in the Room provided Z with a new horizon of expectations, beyond her disease and, even, her death. This way, material culture became not just the frame where experience is performed, but a bearer that reflects, frames, and defines feelings and emotions.

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Clara Zarza (Institute of Language, Literature and Anthropology, Spanish Research Council, CCHS-CSIC, Madrid)

The Emotional Lives of Objects

This paper will address the theoretical premises through which some contemporary art objects may be considered within the wide range of autobiographical practices for their ability to retain and provoke emotions. The argument put forward will consider certain art-objects as a place or a site of emotional memory in the same sense as Pierre Nora’s description of the “lieux de mémoire”, as conceptual and abstract symbols of personal histories, experiences and emotions.

Through the analysis of how personal emotions are strongly attached to everyday objects, as if contagion by them or even contained within them, two main kinds of emotional-memory-objects will be presented: The “memorabilia”— any kind of object from the past treasured, not for its material value but for the involuntary memories and emotions it brings to its owner. The “souvenir”— any object deliberately chosen to embody or symbolize a part of our lives invested with emotional content and kept to remember (in French “souvenir”) that time.

Two key studies will be discussed in parallel to these two conceptions of emotional-memory-objects: Mona Hatoum’s 1996 piece Doormat and Miyako Ishiuichi’s photographic series Mother’s 2000-2005. These works have been chosen for their complexity and richness in conveying personal emotions, strongly autobiographically rooted, that cannot however be reduced to a single event and that, only in their capacity to provoke such emotions, become recognizable for the viewer.

Taking these two pieces as an argumentative illustration it will be argued that objects have an emotional life and contain emotions, but are also able to transmit or provoke them. It is through the various ways of emotionally experiencing the art object that the viewer constructs and adds to the meaning of these memory pieces. Finally, it will be discussed that due to its public disclosure, the symbolization of emotional memories through art-objects may be understood as challenging autobiographical form without a narrative or narrating self, as a personal meaning or experience that may be empathically understood by the viewer.